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EVALUATING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING REGULATION
UNDER A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY
Michael R. Lieberman*
INTRODUCTION

Significant increases in production and exploitation of
domestic fuels in recent years has spawned many arguments on
contentious issues surrounding oil and gas production in the United
States. One of the most debated and publicized issues involves the
process of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, often known
as "hydrofracking" or "fracking."
This article explains how fracking works and proposes
a means for regulating the activity in cases of groundwater
contamination, which is one of the chief concerns associated with
this controversial practice. Part I of this article provides a brief
history of fracking and discusses how the process works. Part I also
discusses the potential economic and societal benefits, as well as the
environmental and health risks accompanying the fracking process.
Next, Part II explores the appropriateness of imposing strict
liability for injuries caused by fracking. Using a common-law
analysis, this part shows that fracking should be classified as an
abnormally dangerous activity subject to strict liability. Thereafter,
Part II considers statutory means of imposing strict liability.
Finally, Part III introduces a unique legislative proposal that
would call for strict liability in cases of groundwater contamination
caused by fracking, create a private right of action for homeowners,
and establish an industry-financed fund to compensate those persons
negatively affected by fracking. This article concludes with a brief
summary of how an economic analysis of law supports the foregoing
legislative proposal and its application of strict liability to hydraulic
fracturing.
* J.D., 2015 Albany Law School; Executive Editor, Albany Law Review, 2014-

2015; B.A., 2011, The Ohio State University. I am very grateful to ProfessorDale
Moore for her guidance and support and to the Buffalo Environmental Law Journal for their hard work and professionalism.
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Ultimately, this article suggests that categorizing fracking
as an abnormally dangerous activity subject to strict liability may
increase accountability and encourage diligence on the part of
well developers and operators, thus enhancing safety both in the
workplace and the community while retaining the numerous benefits
that fracking brings to the table.

I. FRACKING
A. What Is Fracking? Is It Dangerous?
Hydraulic fracturing is a process of natural gas and oil
extraction by which fluid is pumped at high pressure down a wellbore
creating fractures in the rock formations below to "stimulate the
flow of natural gas or oil, thereby increasing the volumes that can be
recovered." ' This fluid, known as "fracking fluid," is a proprietary
mixture generally containing water, proppant, and chemicals.2
"Proppants" generally consist of "sand, ceramic pellets or other
small incompressible particles" that "hold open" fractures once
created.3
Fracking produces potentially harmful wastewater.4 Between
sixty and eighty percent of the fracking fluid is absorbed into the
shale formation deep below the surface, while the remaining twenty
to forty percent returns to the surface as wastewater.5 The fracking
fluid that returns to the surface is known as flowback.6 Flowback

'The Process ofHydraulic Fracturing,ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.

gov/hydraulicfractuing/process-hydraulic-fractuing

(last updated May 21,

2013).

21d.
3Id.

I Rebecca Hammer & Jeanne VanBriesen, NaturalResources Defense Council,In
FrackingXsWake: New Rules Are Needed to ProtectOurHealth andEnvironment
from Contaminated Wastewater, NRDC, at 1, 3 (2012), http://www.nrdc.org/en-

ergy/files/Fracking-Wastewater-FullReport.pdf. [hereinafter In Fracking ' Wake].
' What isFlowback, and How Does it Differ From Produced Water?, INST. FOR
ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH FOR N. PA, (Mar. 24, 2011), http://energy.wilkes.edu/

pages/205.asp.
6
1d.
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"contains clays, chemical additives, dissolved metal ions and total
dissolved solids."' Additionally, some naturally occurring water
also flows back up the wellhead to the surface.' This is known as
"produced water."9 Produced water "contains dissolved hydrocarbons
such as methane, ethane and propane along with naturally occurring
radioactive materials ... such as radium isotopes."10 Well-regulated
management and disposal of this wastewater is of central importance
as "these by-products present significant risks to human health and
the environment if not managed properly.""l
Specifically, fracking chemicals and other naturally
occurring compounds that return to the surface during the fracking
process include over a dozen known or suspected carcinogens,
developmental neurotoxins, volatile organic compounds, and
endocrine disrupting chemicals.12 Exposure to these substances has
been linked to miscarriage and stillbirth, preterm birth and low birth
weight, among other serious reproductive and developmental health
risks.13 The alarming list of possible health risks associated with
fracking ultimately led New York Governor Andrew Cuomo to ban
fracking in 2014.14
B. History and Developments in Fracking
A Civil War veteran named Edward Roberts came up with
an idea after observing artillery rounds during the war. 15 He thought
that he might be able to increase oil production by exploding what
7Id.

8id.
9Id.

10Id.

1 In Fracking' Wake, supranote 4, at 10-11.
12Ellen Webb et al., Developmental andReproductive Effects of Chemicals Associatedwith UnconventionalOil and NaturalGas Operations,29 REV. ENVTL.
HEALTH 307, 307-08 (2014).
S3 Id.at 311-12.
14Thomas Kaplan, CitingHealth Risks,Cuomo BansFrackingin New York State,
N.Y TIMEs (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/nyregion/cuo-

mo-to-ban-fracking-in-new-york-state-citing-health-risks.html.
11Zachariah Rivenbark, Introduction to Fracking, JURIST (July 20, 2013, 10:28

AM), http://jurist.org/feature/2013/07/fracking-introduction.php.
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became known as a "Roberts Torpedo" inside an oil well and then
filling the borehole with water." He was right; production quickly
increased by more than 1,000 percent in test wells as a result of his
new technique of production enhancement.17
The first attempts at non-explosive fracturing began in
the 1930s, when acid was used successfully in several drilling
operations.18 In 1939, Ira McCullough developed an improved
proj ectile-based technique that enhanced well production. 19 By 1940,
however, chemicals, rather than explosives or projectiles, became
widely used in the fracking process.2 z Shortly after McCullough
developed his method of oil production, a man by the name of Floyd
Farris of Stanolind Oil and Gas Corporation came up with the idea
of hydraulic fracturing, which uses water rather than explosions
or acid to stimulate production."z Hydraulic fracturing was used
in the seventies and eighties with great success in enhancing well
production in Texas, and it became widely used on a commercial
scale in 2003.2
The storied rise of fracking across the country has not been
without controversy and stark opposition. In New York, the issue
has been particularly contentious. In fact, New York has been
characterized as "[t]he most notable focal point of opposition to
fracking." z3 In December 2014, Governor Cuomo announced a ban
on fracking in New York State. 4 Since his announcement, however,
Governor Cuomo has declined to take steps to change the law

16

Id.

17Id.

18Id.
19 Id.

Barbara Warner & Jennifer Shapiro, Fracingand Federalism:A Regulatory
Battle of the Titans, AM. POL. Sci. ASS'N 3, August 27, 2012, availableat http://
ssrn.com/abstract 2107496.
21 Rivenbark, supra note 15.
20

22 Jd.

23

Kevin Hasset & Apama Mathur, Benefits of Hydraulic Fracturing,91 Ox-

FORD ENERGY F. 11 (Feb. 2013), www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/OEF_-91 .pdf.
24 Kaplan, supranote 14.

2014-2015]

HYDRAULIC FRACTURING REGULATION

41

such that the ban would become permanent.2 5 This leaves open the
possibility that the ban could be changed or even lifted in the future
by a subsequent administration.2 6
If fracking is given the go-ahead in New York, important
decisions about how to maximize public safety and how to
compensate for injury must be made. Such decisions will be based,
at least in part, on an understanding of the benefits and potential
risks of fracking.
C. Prospective Benefits of Fracking
Fracking proponents point to its many economic benefits.
For example, in 2011 the United States produced an estimated
$36 billion worth of shale gas.27 Fracking also has a significant
potential for creating jobs. Employment statistics show an increase
of more than sixty-seven percent in the oil and gas extraction sector
nationwide, with 198,400 jobs in that sector as of December 2012.28
Notably, "the shale gas industry supported 600,000 jobs in 2010, a
number that would increase to 870,000 by 2015."29
In addition to jobs, fracking may bring the United States
closer to energy independence, allowing it to meet its energy needs
without seeking oil from overseas. According to the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation, the Marcellus Shale
formation-a black shale formation below the surfaces of Ohio,
West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York-could potentially
contain up to 489 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.3 ° This is roughly
444.5 times the amount of natural gas consumed in New York State
each year.3 1
25

See Scott Waldman, State to make fracking ban official, not permanent,POLIT-

ICO NEW YORK (Apr. 29, 2015, 5:35 A.M.), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/

article/albany/2015/04/8566938/state-make-fracking-ban-official-not-penanent.
26

Id.

Hasset & Mathur, supra note 23, at 12.

27
28

29
31

Id.
at 13.
Marcellus Shale, N.Y

_d.

DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERV.,

ergy/46288.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
31 Id.

http://www.dec.ny.gov/en-
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D. Potential Injuries Resulting from Fracking
Groundwater contamination, chemical spills, and methane

releases are examples of major health risks that may be caused by
fracking.32 Some claim that these risks are unavoidable; a former
Shell Oil Company President once proclaimed that while most
wells have not had any issues, "everybody knows that some wells
go bad."33 Ultimately, opponents argue that the health risks, natural
resource degradation, and broader economic impacts outweigh any
potential benefits derived from the controversial process.34
II. IMPOSITION OF STRICT LIABILITY FOR FRACKING-RELATED
INJURIES

A. Strict Liability in General
The theory of strict liability rests on the policy argument that
"those who engage in activity of sufficiently high risk of harm to
others, especially where there are reasonable even if more costly
alternatives, should bear the cost of harm caused the innocent."35
The name given to activities for which strict liability is imposed
varies by jurisdiction, with some jurisdictions calling them
"abnormally dangerous" and others calling them "ultrahazardous."
Notwithstanding the differences in name, the principle is the same,
and this Article adopts the Restatement's "abnormally dangerous"
label.36
Alvin Powell, Weighing the Risks ofFracking,HARv. GAZETTE (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/201 1/10/weighing-the-risks-of-fracking/.
12

33Kevin Begos, FormerShell President:Everybody Knows Some Fracking Wells
Go Bad,Bus. INSIDER (July 28, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/

hofmeister-everybody-knows-some-fracking-wells-go-bad-2013-7.
31See

Tony Dutzik, Elizabeth Ridlington & John Rumpler, The Costs ofFracking,
ENV'T AM. RESEARCH & POLICY CTR. 12-29 (Fall 2012), available at www.enviromnentamerica.org/sites/enviromnent/files/reports/The / 20 Costs / 20of"/20

Fracking%20vUS.pdf.
35 Doundoulakis

v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y2d 440, 448 (1977) (citations

omitted).
36

See RESTATEMENT

(SEcOND) OF TORTS

§ §

519, 520 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
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The foundation of the strict liability doctrine is best
understood through an analysis of an 1868 English case: Rylands
v. Fletcher." Plaintiff Fletcher operated a mine and defendants
Rylands and Horrocks owned a mill in Fletcher's neighborhood.3 8
Defendants sought to construct a reservoir near Fletcher's land for
storing water for their mill.39 Unbeknownst to either party, there were
five vertical mine shafts and connected horizontal shafts beneath the
adjoining property. 40 The mine shafts were remnants of the "old and
disused mining passage and works" beneath the property.4 1 When
the defendants attempted to construct their reservoir, the shafts filled
with water and overflowed, flooding Fletcher's mine and causing
considerable damage. 42 Fletcher subsequently sued the defendants,
and after multiple appeals, the Court of Exchequer Chamber found
in his favor.43
The court provided what has become something of a defining
statement of the theory of strict liability:
We think the true rule of law is, that the person who,
for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not
do so, is primafacie answerable for all the damage
which is the natural consequence of its escape.44
The court further noted that "[b]ut for his act in bringing it
there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he
should at his peril keep it there, so that no mischief should accrue,
or answer for that natural and anticipated consequence.1 45 The court
explained the basic rationale underlying the theory of strict liability,
37 Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken from

Eng.).
38 Id.
39

Id.

40 Id.
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45 Id.

44
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stating that "the doctrine is founded on good sense. For when one
person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently,
damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the
party to suffer.

46

B. Applying Strict Liability in Cases Involving Injuries
Resulting from Fracking: The Common-Law Analysis
1.Abnormally Dangerous Activities
The process of classifying an activity as abnormally
dangerous begins with an analysis of multiple factors, none of
which is necessarily determinative. 47 This is a fact-based analysis;
that is, whether an activity is abnormally dangerous depends on the
specific circumstances surrounding the activity, and just because an
activity is abnormally dangerous in one situation does not mean it
is automatically so in every situation.48 Strict liability is concerned
with risk creation that is so unusual, based on the magnitude of the
risk and the attendant circumstances, that no amount of reasonable
care should relieve the actor of liability for harm that results. 4
2. The Second Restatement of Torts
With regard to strict liability, two provisions of the Second
Restatement of Torts generally govern; namely, sections 519 and 520
provide a framework within which most states conduct their strict
liability analyses. Section 519 provides a definition, and Section 520
provides a six-factor test that has been adopted by the New York
Court of Appeals. 50 The purpose of this section is to discuss these
provisions and provide some insight into how they may be applied
to fracking litigation.
46 See id.

Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y2d 440, 448 (1977). Interestingly,
this decision came out in the same year that the second Restatement of the law of

Torts was published. See RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW. INST.

48

Doundoulakis, 42 N.Y2d at 448.

19

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

51

See Doundoulakis, 42 N.Y2d at 448.

520 cmt. f.

1977).
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Section 519 provides that "[o]ne who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land, or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm. "51
Furthermore, Section 520 provides the factors considered by courts
in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. In
most cases, several factors must be present for strict liability to be
imposed.5' No one factor is indispensable, and not every factor is
required in every case.54
The first factor to consider is the "existence of a high degree
of risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of others.
Specifically, "[t]he harm threatened must be major in degree, and
sufficiently serious in its possible consequences to justify holding
the defendant strictly responsible for subjecting others to an unusual
risk. ' 56 In the case of fracking, the risks may include groundwater
contamination and air pollution, which may affect the person, land
or chattels of a great number of people who rely on a water source
in close proximity to a well or who breathe the air close to a well.
The next factor is the "likelihood that the harm that results
from it will be great. ' 58 This factor involves a sliding scale analysis;
the greater the potential harm, the less likely its occurrence needs to
be in order for the activity to be regarded as abnormally dangerous.
Even if fracking can be conducted safely and with the utmost care,
this factor may still be satisfied because the potential harm can be
quite significant.

§ 519; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§ 20 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) ("An actor who carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity is subject to strict liability for physical harm resulting from the activity.").
52 See, e.g., Doundoulakis, 42 N.Y2d at 448 (applying the six factors provided in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520.
51 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f.
54Id.
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

55Id.

§ 520(a).
Id. § 520 cmt. g.
51 See Powell, supra note 35.
56

58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

59 See

id. § 520 cmt. g.

§ 520(b).
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Another factor is the "inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care.''6° With regard to this factor, the risk
need not be the kind of risk that cannot possibly be eliminated.61
It is sufficient under this factor that an inherent, substantial, and
unavoidable risk remains, despite the exercise of reasonable care
and the absence of any negligence.6 2 Under the Third Restatement,
this factor is characterized as "indispensable.1 63 Notably, the Third
Restatement also suggests that this factor is "substantially, and often
primarily, relied on" by courts.64
The next factor is the "extent to which the activity is not a
matter of common usage. 65 For the purposes ofthis section, common
usage refers to an activity that is "customarily carried on by the
great mass of mankind or by many people in the community. 66 With
regard to oil wells, the central importance of oil to American society
dictates that wells be drilled, and certain land contains oil and lends
itself to drilling. 67 Thus on the one hand, the drilling of oil wells can
be said to be a matter of common usage on certain oil-rich lands. On
the other hand, most individuals are not engaged in the activity, and
drilling is only carried out in certain places. 6 Even if drilling were
to be considered a matter of common usage of land containing oil, it
is not a matter of common use of land in general.69 It is unclear how
this factor applies in the context of fracking, and the analysis of this
factor seems likely to be factually driven.
An additional factor for courts to consider is the
"inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on."170 For this factor, courts consider whether a certain use is a

60

See id. § 520(c).
§ 520 cmt. h.

61 See id.
62 See id.

63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS

Id.
65 See RESTATEMENT

§

20 cmt. h.

64

66

(SEcoND) OF TORTS

See id. § 520 cmt. i.

67Id.
68

Id.

69

Id.

70 See

id.

§ 520(e).

§ 520(d).
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"non-natural use."7 1 If an activity is to be conducted but can only
be conducted in one place, then this necessarily must be considered
an appropriate place.72 For example, conventional wisdom dictates
that "oil wells can be located only where there is oil." 73 However,
it may be more accurate to say that oil wells can only be located
where we can reach the oil. The high demand for oil dictates that it
be extracted from the earth, constantly improving technology allows
for the extraction of oil from places never previously accessible.
Thus, while the location of then-extractable oil has in the past
dictated where wells were located, today's wells can be located in
significantly more places, including peoples' backyards,7 4 making
this factor more important today than ever before. In addition,
where a highly dangerous activity must be carried out in a particular
location, whether that activity is regarded as abnormally dangerous
for strict liability purposes will depend on the activity's value to the
community. Interestingly, there is a divide, even among states with
a large oil industry presence, regarding whether drilling an oil well
is an abnormally dangerous activity.75 This factor therefore is less
predictable.
The final factor is the "extent to which [an activity's] value
to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes."7 6 This
factor is of cardinal importance in communities whose economic
wellbeing is so directly tied into an activity that their prosperity
depends on its being carried out there.7 7 Members of such a
community are understandably biased in favor of the industry upon
which their wellbeing depends, whereas others are more distant and
less invested, and may not have a strong opinion either way, or may
oppose the industry entirely. It should be noted that the decision to
impose strict liability lies solely with the court, "and it is no part of
'1See id. § 520 cmt. j.
72

Id.

71 See

id.

Kate Murphy, When the Backyard Views Are of Wells and DrillingRigs, N.Y
TIMEs (July 31, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/O7/31/realestate/31nati.
74

html.
75 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
76 See id. § 520(f).
77 Id. § 520 cmt. k.

520 cmt. k.
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the province of the jury to decide whether an industrial enterprise
upon which the community's prosperity might depend is located in
the wrong place."78
To some extent, the fourth, fifth, and sixth factors can be
viewed as variations of the same factor. The appropriateness of the
activity to the place where it is carried on is, in essence, a question
of whether a particular use of land is a "natural use." This is just
another way of determining the extent to which an activity is a matter
of common usage. The degree to which an activity's value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes defines how
appropriate the activity is for the place where it is carried on, and
an activity on which a community depends is likely to be a matter
of common usage for that community. Therefore, these final three
factors are substantially intertwined and can be considered together.
Ultimately, it is likely that fracking is a good candidate for
the imposition of strict liability. There is a high degree ofrisk of harm
to the person, land, or chattels of those living in close proximity to a
well in that groundwater contamination and air pollution may pose
significant health risks. Along those same lines, the second factor
is probably satisfied because the health risks posed to many people
have the potential to be substantial. It is currently unclear whether
the risks can be eliminated with the exercise of reasonable care, and,
as will be set forth in more detail below, this is likely to be a very
important, if not the most important factor. The final three factors,
that is, the extent to which the activity is a matter of common usage,
the appropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on,
and the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by
its dangerous attributes, are likely to vary from state to state.
In New York these factors would most likely favor the
imposition of strict liability. This is because unlike states such as
Texas and Pennsylvania, oil and gas extraction is not a common
use of New York land, and many parts of New York are fairly
heavily populated making fracking inappropriate in large portions
of the state. Its value to the community is essentially unknown at
this time. However, unlike states such as Texas and Pennsylvania,

181 d. § 520 cmt. 1.
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New York does not have longstanding and deeply rooted community
dependence on, and support for, the oil industry. Finally, it should be
noted that courts in many jurisdictions have imposed strict liability
for activities that cause the pollution of water sources.7 9 Thus, it may
be appropriate to impose strict liability upon fracking operations in
New York where groundwater contamination results.
3. The Third Restatement of Torts
The Third Restatement provides that "[a]n actor who carries
on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability
for physical harm resulting from the activity."8 ° Abnormally
dangerous activities are defined as those activities that are "not of
common usage" and "create[] a foreseeable and highly significant
risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by
all actors." 81Notably, this applies only to harm flowing from the
activity, the occurrence of which was among the risks inherent in
the activity.82 In other words, strict liability is not imposed for the
realization of completely unforeseen risks. An important distinction,
then, between the second and third Restatements' strict liability
provisions is that the Third Restatement appears to place greater
emphasis on foreseeability.83 This may reflect an important shift in
P.2d 267, 274-75 (Utah 1982)
(holding defendants strictly liable for causing oil well waste waters to pollute
plaintiff's water well).
79See, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657

20(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
Id. § 20(b)(l)-(2).
12 See id. cmt. e.
83See id. cmt. i. The First Restatement reserved the imposition of strict liability
80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §
81

for situations in which a defendant should have recognized that a given result was
a likely consequence of his or her actions. See id.; RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND) OF TORTS

§ 519. Without explanation, this focus on the foreseeability of harm was abandoned in the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. i;
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. g (explaining that "[i]t is not enough
that there is a recognizable risk of some relatively slight harm," while remaining
silent as to whether it might be sufficient that there is a recognizable, that is, a
foreseeable risk, of harm that is relatively significant). However, the Second Restatement's "recognizable risk" language was interpreted, over time, as requiring
that the risk be foreseeable. See RESTATEMET (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. i (citing

50
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the way that strict liability will be imposed moving forward, and
courts that rely on the restatements may be inclined to focus much
more on the foreseeability of the risk in determining whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous.
4. Application of Case Law and Restatement Factors to
Fracking
In recent years, fracking has become highly politicized and
controversial. The issue is particularly contentious in New York,
and there are certainly interesting arguments on both sides. The
ideal solution would be to find a middle ground that allows for the
retention of the numerous benefits of fracking while ensuring that
it is conducted safely and that those harmed by it will have open
avenues of relief
As will be set forth in greater detail, categorizing fracking
as an abnormally dangerous activity subject to strict liability may
increase accountability and encourage diligence, thus enhancing
safety both in the workplace and the community while retaining
the numerous benefits that fracking brings to the table. This Article
posits that the imposition of strict liability forces the internalization
of at least some negative externalities associated with fracking, and
strict liability may also lead to increased safety measures, thereby
encouraging greater efforts to prevent groundwater contamination.
The result might be to make fracking more acceptable.
To determine if fracking may properly be deemed an
abnormally dangerous activity, the long-standing factors set forth in
the Second Restatement should be applied in addition to the relevant
case law to determine how courts will likely analyze the issue. First,
perhaps the most important of the Section 520 factors in terms of
hydraulic fracturing litigation will be the degree to which the risks
can be avoided with the exercise of reasonable care.

Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., CIV-91-525, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17228, at *29

(D. Ariz. 1998); 2 A.L.I.,

REPORTERS'

STUDY, ENTER. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERS. IN-

JURY 368 (1991)). The Third Restatement's abnormally dangerous activities provi-

sion marks a clear return to a foreseeability requirement in strict liability analysis.
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New York courts have held that "where the evidence supports
a finding that the dangers associated with the activity in question can
be eliminated or diminished with the exercise of reasonable care,
dismissal [of a lawsuit] is appropriate, since an activity which can
be safely performed generally will not be deemed to be [abnormally
dangerous]. 8 4 For example, in New York, courts have held that the
storage and transportation ofgasoline is not an abnormally dangerous
activity.15 An important aspect of this determination is that with
adequate precaution, the risks associated with such activities can
be prevented or eliminated.86 It is therefore worth discussing this
issue in greater detail. The first step is to determine whether "safe
fracking" is a realistic possibility.
Congress has asked the EPA to conduct a study on the
potential impacts of fracking on drinking water. 87 The EPA's
ultimate findings will likely play an important role in the courts'
determinations regarding whether the risks of fracking can be
eliminated with reasonable care. EPA released a progress report in
2012, and a draft report is expected to be released in 2014.88
84 Plainview

Water Dist. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 009975-01, 2006 N.Y Misc.
LEXIS 3730, at *33 (citing DeFoe Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 549 N.YS.2d 133,
135 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 819 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (S.D.N.Y 1993) (dismissing a claim of nuisance

based on an ultrahazardous activity due to acknowledgment by plaintiff that the
risks of the activity at issue could be eliminated by due care and adequate maintenance).
85 Plainview

Water Dist., 2006 N.Y Misc. LEXIS 3730, at *34 (quoting 750 Old
Country Road Realty Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 645 N.YS.2d 186, 187 (App. Div. 4th

Dep't 1996)); see also Searle v. Suburban Propane Div. of Quantum Chem. Corp.,
700 N.Y S.2d 588, 591 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000); Biniek v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
818 A.2d 330, 338, (N.J. Super. Ct. Somerset County 2002).

Plainview Water Dist., 2006 N.Y Misc. Lexis 3730, at **33-34 ("[T]he Court
finds that the overall inference to be drawn from the plaintiff's expert submissions,
is that by adopting reasonable precautions and utilizing properly constructed and
designed tanks, the defendants could effectively have prevented tank failure, leak86

age and contamination."); Searle, 700 N.YS.2d at 591 (declining to label the use

and storage of propane as an ultrahazardous activity because there are "reasonable
precautions that can be taken to prevent explosion").
87EPA sStudy

ofHydraulicFracturingand its PotentialImpact on Drinking Wa-

ter Resources, ENVTL.
Nov. 30, 2014).
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The EPA's progress report has revealed that 652 different
products containing chemicals classified as known or suspected
carcinogens were used in fracking operations between 2005 and 2009,
with fourteen hydraulic fracturing service companies reporting.89
Data collected by the EPA also suggests that the preparation for
production of natural gas wells that have been fractured is one of the
leading causes of air pollution in the natural gas industry. 90
On the other hand, there appear to be some indications that
safe fracking is a realistic possibility. The New York State Health
Department has suggested that fracking can be conducted quite
safely, with minimal, if any human chemical exposure. 91 Moreover,
new industry standards are thought to be capable of reducing air
pollution and methane emissions, and the standards are "expected
to yield a nearly 95 percent reduction in [gas emissions] from more
than 11,000 new hydraulically fractured gas wells each year."92
It may be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that risks can or
cannot be eliminated, but activities may be subject to strict liability
even in the absence of proof regarding the inability to eliminate the
risks with reasonable care. 93 Therefore despite its likely importance,
FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 60
12 12 14

production/files/documents/hf-report20
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89 PROGRESS REPORT,
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(Dec. 2012), www2.epa.gov/sites/
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supranote 88, at 29.

Hearingon Oil and Gas New Source PerformanceStandards (NSPS)and Na-

tional Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) Before S.
Comm. ofEnv. And Pub. Works, 112th Cong. 1, 4 (June 19, 2012) (opening state-

ment of Regina McCarthy, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Air and Radiation, Envtl.
Prot. Agency), available at http://epa.gov/ocir/hearings/pdf/2012_0619_hearing
witness testimonymccarthy.pdf [hereinafter OpeningStatement].
91 Danny

2013),

Hakim, Gas DrillingIs Called Safe in New York, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 3,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/nyregion/hydrofracking-safe-says-

ny-health-dept-analysis.html?_r-0.
92 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
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1 (2012), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/
oilandgas/pdfs/20120417fs.pdf.
93 See Town of New Windsor v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 10-CV-8611, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27264, at **42-43 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 1, 2012) (finding it plausible
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this factor-like any other Section 520 factor-is not necessarily
decisive in determining whether fracking is an abnormally dangerous
activity.
C. Applying Strict Liability in Cases Involving Injuries
Resulting From Fracking: The Legislative Approach
The application of strict liability in cases of groundwater
contamination caused by hydraulic fracturing may also be
accomplished through state or federal legislation.
At the federal level, Congress has exempted hydraulic
fracturing from many of the safeguards that were previously in place
and would otherwise have offered some measure of protection to
those who might be impacted by its harmful effects.9 4 For example,
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 amends the Safe Drinking Water Act
to exclude "the underground injection of fluids or propping agents
(other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations
related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities. 9 5 In other
words, the "[u]nderground injection of fluids related to oil and gas
production (including flowback and produced water) is authorized
by the Safe Drinking Water Act."9 6
Moreover, harmful waste resulting from the exploration or
production of oil and gas is exempt from the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act.97 This is yet another example of the extreme
leeway at the federal level given to the oil industry with regard to
activity where all restatement factors supported this finding except factor (c), the
inability to eliminate the risks with reasonable care, which had not been established).
94 Elizabeth Burleson, CooperativeFederalismand Hydraulicfracturing:A human Rightto a CleanEnvironment,22 CORNELL L.J. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 307 (2012)

("The oil and gas industry successfully lobbied for exemptions for hydrofracking
from several major federal environmental laws.").
95 42

U.S.C. § 300h(d) (2013); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 58-109, §
322, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h).
96 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 88, at 19 n. 12.
97

ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, EXEMPTION OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION

5-6 (2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/special/oil/oil-gas.pdf.
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fracking operations. As a result, many states have attempted to fill
the void through state-level legislation. One strategy for closing the
fracking liability loopholes is to create statutory presumptive liability
for groundwater contamination caused by hydraulic fracturing.
1. Presumptive Liability
The concept of presumptive liability has been raised
frequently with respect to fracking.98 Presumptive liability differs
from strict liability in that it creates a rebuttable presumption,
allowing a defendant to raise a limited number of defenses to escape
liability. 99 In Michigan, a proposed amendment to the "Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Act" creates a rebuttable
presumption that any person conducting hydraulic fracturing
operations is liable for contamination of groundwater in the vicinity
of a well if one or more of the substances that were injected into that
well are discovered in the water. 100
North Carolina has passed legislation in the same vein.l"l It
provides in pertinent part that, subject to a limited number of specified
defenses, oil or gas well developers or operators are presumed to be
responsible for water supply contamination occurring within 5,000
feet of a wellhead. 102 In addition, the law requires well developers
or operators to provide an adequate replacement water supply in the
event water contamination occurs within 5000 feet of a well.103 This
is in addition to any other remedies that may be available, including,
but not limited to, monetary compensation for any damage done
to the water supply. 10 4 Thus, North Carolina's legislative solution
98

See 225 ILL. Cow.

STAT.

732/1-85 (2013) (establishing a rebuttable presump-

tion of liability regarding pollution or diminution of a water supply); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 113-421 (2012) (creating presumptive liability for water contamination
caused by an oil or gas well developer or operator).
99 See, e.g., 2011 NC S.B. 820, § 113-421(a)(1).
"I See Mich. H.B. No. 4736 (2011), availableat http://www.legislature.mi.gov/

documents/2011-2012/billintroduced/House/pdf/2011 -HIB-4736.pdf.
101

See N.C.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.

GEN. STAT. §§

113-421.
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with regard to liability for groundwater contamination caused by
hydraulic fracturing, much like Michigan's, is to create a rebuttable
presumption of liability and provide substantially more protections
against groundwater contamination than the federal framework.
Moreover, the North Carolina statute provides that the presumption
may be rebutted ifit can be proved by a preponderance ofthe evidence
that the contamination pre-dates the drilling activities, the oil or gas
developer or operator was refused access to the land in order to
conduct a pre-drilling test of the water supply, the water supply is not
within 5,000 feet of one of the oil or gas developer's or operator's
wellheads, or there is another cause of the contamination. 105
2. Proposed Legislation in New York
In New York, a bill that has been introduced in the Assembly
proposes the imposition of strict liability for those who undertake
hydraulic fracturing within the state.1 6 The bill states that the
legislature deems fracking activities, including the transportation of
fracking chemicals and wastewater, to be hazardous and imposes
strict liability upon anyone who undertakes such activities in New
York. 107 Moreover, this bill provides further protection for those
harmed by fracking by providing for an award of attorneys' fees
and costs of litigation to plaintiffs who are awarded damages. 1
If enacted, the legislation would force oil and gas well developers
and operators to internalize one of the costly negative externalities
associated with fracking; that is, the high costs of litigation.
3. A New Legislative Direction
One way to address the issue of liability in fracking-related
groundwater contamination in New York would be to enact legislation
Id.

105

106Assemb.

B. A00846, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (N.Y 2013), availableat http://as-

sembly. state. ny.us/leg/?default fld=&bn=A00846&tenn=2013 &Summary=Y&
Actions=Y&Text=Y&Votes=Y#A00846.
107

Id.

108

Id.
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specifically pertaining to hydraulic fracturing operations and the
chemicals it uses. The legislation would borrow the fee-shifting
provision from the New York bill discussed above and would be
modeled in large measure on New York Navigation Law Article 12,
also known as "the Oil Spill Act."1 9 The proposed legislation would
call for the creation of a fund similar to the New York environmental
protection and spill compensation fund established by the Oil Spill
Act. 110 The fund would be created from monies collected from
various sources, including a licensing fee assessed upon all well
operators and other major participants in fracking operations, who
must renew their licenses every five years, taxes assessed on a perbarrel basis for each barrel extracted from a given well, and a onetime fee charged to all well operators for the specific purpose of
financing the fund.
The fund would serve to ensure that those affected by
groundwater contamination as a result of fracking operations would
not be without redress when the specific source of the contamination
cannot yet be determined. Much like the Oil Spill Act, the fund
would cover the costs of cleanup and remediation, as well as direct
and indirect damages."' Once the source of the contamination is
established, the fund would then be able to bring an action under this
proposed law to recover these costs. Any damages recovered would
be returned directly to the fund.

19

See N.Y

NAV. LAW

§§ 179-190. "Any person who has discharged petroleum

shall be strictly liable, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs
and all direct and indirect damages." Id. § 181(1).
110 See id. § 171. The Oil Spill Act establishes the New York environmental protection and spill compensation fund, comprised of two separate accounts, which
are funded by license fees and penalty assessments under the Act, as well as surcharges collected per barrel of petroleum. This fund "finances State cleanup efforts when the discharger is unknown, unwilling or unable to pay these costs." See
State v. Green, 96 N.Y2d 403, 406 (2001) ("Once the Fund has disbursed monies
for the cleanup, it must then seek reimbursement from a responsible party.").
"I See N.Y NAV. LAW § 181(3) ("The owner or operator of a major facility or
vessel which has discharged petroleum shall be strictly liable, without regard to
fault, subject to the defenses enumerated in subdivision four of this section, for all
cleanup and removal costs and all direct and indirect damages paid by the fund.").
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However, unlike the Oil Spill Act, which deals only with the
discharge of petroleum, this proposed law would deal specifically
with the discharge of chemicals and byproducts of petroleum
extraction, as well as the petroleum itself In doing so, the proposed
law would cover all contamination caused by fracking operations.
Additionally, the proposed law would create a private right of action
for homeowners whose groundwater is contaminated, providing
yet another avenue for recovery and increasing the likelihood that
injured parties will be made whole.
While fracking is currently banned in New York State, the
ban is not necessarily permanent. 112 The legislation herein proposed
could be helpful in laying the groundwork for a sensible and effective
legislative regime if the ban is lifted in the future. Moreover, this
proposal could potentially serve as a model for other states.
4. An Economic Analysis of the Proposed Legislation
The legislation proposed in this paper would likely be
supported by the economic analysis of law. In general, the economic
theory of law "explains tort law as that body of rules designed to
minimize the social costs of accidents." ' 3 It serves to achieve this
goal of cost minimization because, "by holding a party strictly liable
for harm caused by its actions, the party will make efficient market
decisions and change its actions so as to internalize the cost of the
11 4
damages incurred by its risky activity."
In particular, the proposed legislation would seemingly
appeal to those who subscribe to the exclusively "welfare-based
normative approach" to lawmaking. 115 This theory posits that "legal
rules should be selected entirely with respect to their effects on the
well-being of individuals in society." ' 6 The proposed legislation
112

See supraPart I.B.

13

Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics and the Future of Law, 1997

Wis. L. REV. 433, 440.
14 Hannah Coman, Note, Balancing the Needfor Energy and Clean Water: The
Casefor Applying Strict liability in Hydraulic FracturingSuits, 39 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 131, 147 (2012).
115 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV.
961, 967 (2001).
116Id.
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advances societal well-being by encouraging firms to internalize
the costs of causing, for example, groundwater contamination.
Collecting money from firms before any potential problems arise
and throughout the life of a well provides those who are harmed
with assurance that at least some costs of accidents will be paid by
the responsible firms. This mechanism allows for the retention of the
many benefits of fracking while also providing a safety net for those
who might be adversely affected. Therefore the proposed legislation
promotes the maximization of the wellbeing of individuals.
Furthermore, an important theme of the economic analysis
of law is that behavioral incentives are influenced by substantive
legal rules."' 7 A regime designed to impose strict liability upon firms
engaging in hydraulic fracturing would likely affect the behavior of
those firms. This is likely to be the case because firms are guided by
profit maximization and are thus likely to modify their behavior to
minimize costs and maximize profits. If a firm will be forced to bear
the costs of accidents, including the costs of remediation and any
damages, direct and incidental, then a profit maximizing firm would,
in theory, always choose to incur the costs of preventing an accident
where they are less than the potential costs of failing to do so.
Laws can be enacted to encourage firms to make decisions
that will minimize potential harm to people, but anything less than
strict liability is unlikely to achieve the desired effect. This is because
sophisticated parties will modify their behavior, not according to the
laws as they are written, but to the laws as they are enforced, or
to the extent that they are enforceable.li' In other words, where a
firm believes that it can escape liability based on inadequate laws
or loopholes, it is likely to actively seek to do so. A rational, profitmaximizing firm will not, therefore, bear additional costs of risk
minimization in an effort to reduce the incidence of accidents for
which it believes it will not be liable. The costs of accidents are then
borne entirely by society. Strict liability makes it clear that, should
an accident occur, the costs of the accident are likely to be borne by
the responsible firm rather than the injured party or parties.
"I Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Findingand Efficiency: Toward an Eco-

nomic Theory ofLiability under Uncertainty,61 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 137 (1987).
118Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
Governor Cuomo has closed the door on Fracking in New
York State, but he has not locked the door and thrown away the key.
The time is right to begin considering how to establish a workable,
sensible regulatory regime should the ban be lifted in the future-a
regulatory regime that protects the public without stymying
economic growth. Specifically, the state must determine how to deal
with the issue of liability for groundwater contamination arising out
of fracking operations. Upon considering the restatement factors
traditionally used to determine whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous, fracking would appear to be an excellent candidate for a
strict liability regime.
The most efficient and perhaps the most appropriate way
to impose strict liability may be to do so through legislation. The
proposed legislation herein would call for strict liability in cases
of groundwater contamination caused by fracking, create a private
right of action for homeowners, and establish an industry-financed
fund to compensate those persons negatively affected by fracking.
In doing so, the proposed legislation would be modeled on the most
effective elements of New York's Oil Spill Act, as well as a bill
proposed in the New York State Assembly and similar legislation in
other states. Additionally, the proposed legislation would contain a
fee-shifting provision, so the high cost of litigation would not be a bar
to recovery for individuals harmed by groundwater contamination
caused by fracking.
Finally, this proposal makes sense under an economic
analysis of law. The proposal maximizes societal wellbeing by
allowing society to enjoy the benefits of fracking while reducing
the exposure of individuals to the potential harm that might come
with it. Moreover, the proposal would help ensure that those who
are adversely affected may recover for the harm done to them or to
their property. The regulatory regime set forth in this article offers a
middle ground where the State of New York can realize the benefits
of fracking while mitigating the potential harm. This is the best of
both worlds.

